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ABSTRACT
The traditional approach to the estimation of the offset and
ad-hoc
the
for
criticized
be
can
equations
sterilization
specification of the reaction function of the monetary authorities
and the endogeneity of the domestic credit and foreign reserve
variables in the estimated equations. The paper proposes an
alternative analytical model where the sterilization and offset
equations are derived from an explicit maximization problem solved
by the monetary authority. In such a model, the optimal intervention
and sterilization policies of the monetary authority are shown to be
dependent on the different disturbances hitting the economy and the
preferences of the monetary authority. In particular, under a wide
range of domestic and foreign disturbances the optimal response of
the central bank will lead to negatively correlated comovements of
domestic credit and foreign reserves if the central bank cares more
about the interest rate smoothing objective relative to the foreign
positive
Conversely,
goal.
stabilization
reserve
exchange
correlations between domestic credit and foreign reserves will be
observed if the foreign reserve objective is dominant.
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1. Introduction
In a small open economy under a regime of fixed exchange rates and
high capital mobility, an attempt to expand the money supply through a
domestic credit expansion will lead to offsetting reductions in foreign
exchange rate reserves: in the limiting case of perfect capital
mobility and asset substitutability the money supply is endogenous and
the offset coefficient will be equal to minus one, i.e. any domestic
credit expansion will lead to a one-to-one fall in foreign reserves. In
this case any attempt to sterilize the effects of foreign exchange
interventions on the money supply would be self-defeating and engineer
further foreign reserve losses.
More recent studies of fixed rate regimes and the European
Monetary System in particular
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have stressed that, while the previous

argument is correct for a small open economy bearing the burden of
pegging the exchange rate (a "follower" or "periphery" country) ,
offset coefficients might be very small and sterilization policies
feasible for a "leader" or "center" country in a fixed exchange rate
regime, i.e. the counti::y that is allowed by the "rules of the game" to
set independently its monetary policy.
More strongly, it has been suggested

2

that a way to test

empirically whether a fixed rate regime like the EMS works
asymmetrically (with a leader country setting the monetary policy of
the union and the followers adjusting their money supplies in order to
peg the exchange rate) or symmetrically (with the burden of pegging the
1.

See Roubini (1988 a,b,c) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988 a, b).

2.

See Roubini (1988 a, c).
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exchange rate cooperative ly shared by all the members of the union) is
to estimate the offset and sterilizatio n coefficient s for the members
of the union. In particular, one would expect that:
(a) If a fixed rate regime is characteriz ed by leadership, the
offset coefficient of the leader will be close to zero while the offset
coefficient of the followers will be close to negative one (in the
absence of capital controls). Conversely, in a symmetric regime offset
coefficient s will be negative but smaller than one for all

the member

countries.
(b) In a regime of leadership, estimates of the sterilizatio n
parameter should be close to zero for follower countries given their
inability to sterilize foreign reserve flows and close to minus one for
the leader country.
A large literature in open economy macroeconom ics in the past
decade has analyzed the interaction s between domestic credit policies,
foreign exchange rate reserves and money supplies under a regime of
fixed exchange rates

3

On one side, estimates of capital flow

equations for the Bretton Woods period of fixed rates were performed in
order to obtain estimates of the offset coefficient , i.e. how much of a
domestic credit expansion is offset by a reduction in foreign exchange
reserves. On the other side, sterilizatio n equations for Bretton Woods
period and the successive period of managed rates were estimated to
verify whether central banks are able to sterilize the effects of
foreign exchange rate intervention s on their money supplies. More
3. See Argy and Kouri (1974), Kouri and Porter (1974), Herring and
Marston (1977 a, b), Kouri (1975), Marston (1980), Neumann (1978,
1984), Obstfeld (1978, 1982a, 1982b) among the others.
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recently, a number of authors have tried to test the hypothesis of a
"German leadership" of the EMS versus a "cooperativ e" model of the EMS
by estimating sterilizatio n and offset equations for the most recent
EMS period
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The objective of this paper is twofold:
(1) To show that the traditional , and generally used, approach to
the estimation of the offset and sterilizatio n equations is flawed
because of the ad-hoc specificatio n of the reaction function of the
monetary authorities and the endogeneity of the domestic credit and
foreign reserve variables in the estimated equations.
(2) To propose an alternative analytical model where the
sterilizatio n and offset equations are derived from an explicit
maximizatio n problem solved by the monetary authority. In such a model,
an optimal reaction function for the monetary authority is derived and
the optimal interventio n and sterilizatio n policies are shown to be
dependent on the different disturbance s hitting the economy and the
preferences of the monetary authorities .
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the
problems with the traditional approach to the specificatio n and
estimation of the offset and sterilizatio n equations. Section 3
presents the alternative model of a central bank behavior and shows the
implication s of this model for the analysis of the sterilizatio n

4. Roubini (1988 a) estimates sterilizatio n and offset equations for
the EMS countries. Mastropasqu a, Micossi and Rinaldi (1988) and
Giavazzi (1987) estimate sterilizatio n equations. Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1988 b) abandon the structural reaction function estimation
approach and attempt to estimate the reduced form reaction functions of
the monetary authorities of the EMS.
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policies of the monetary authorit y. Section 4 .conclud es and suggest
some avenues for further research .

2. The Traditio nal Approach to the Steriliz ation and Offset Eguation s.

The basic approach followed by all the studies of steriliz ation
policies has been to specify an arbitrar y reaction function of the
monetary authori ties relating the change in domestic credit (DDCt) to
the change in net foreign assets (DNFAt) and a set of other policy
objectiv es (usually the inflatio n rate (INFt) and deviatio n of output
from trend (YGAPt):

(a)

In

equation (a), the paramet er a

1

is an estimate of the degree of

steriliz ation of foreign reserves followed by the monetary authori ties.
For given levels of the inflatio n rates and deviatio n of output from
trend, a

1

measures how much of a change in foreign exchange reserves

deriving from interven tions in the exchange rate market is steriliz ed
by the monetary authori ties. For a
while a

1

1

- -1 the steriliz ation is complete

> -1 implies a degree of steriliz ation that is less than full.

The inflatio n rate enters in the reaction function with a negative sign
(a

2

<0) since the monetary authorit y will react to an increase in the

inflatio n rate with a contrac tion of domestic credit while the output
gap variable will have a negative sign (a

3

< 0) because the central

5

bank will react to a fall of output relative to its trend by expanding
domestic credit
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One of the problems with equation (a) is the endogeneity of the
net foreign asset variable in the reaction function (a): because of
this endogeneity OLS estimates of the sterilization coefficient will be
inconsistent. This endogeneity of the reserve variable derives from the
fact that, under a system of fixed exchange rate, a domestic credit
'·

expansion will be offset by a fall in foreign exchange rate reserves;
the offset coefficient will be greater the larger is the degree of
capital mobility and asset substitutability between domestic and
foreign assets. It then follows that, in a reaction function like (a),
the net foreign asset is an endogenous variable and that high
coefficients on the foreign asset variable in the estimated reaction
function might be wrongly interpreted as high sterilization
5.
Herring and Marston (1977a) estimated a reaction function of the
Bundesbank for the 1960-1971 and found that during each quarter of that
period approximately 90 % of the change in foreign reserves was
sterilized; this suggest a policy of almost complete sterilization of
foreign reserve flows. Obstfeld (1982) estimated a similar reaction
function for the 1975-81 period and found that the sterilization
coefficient was not significantly different from minus one, a result
that would imply a policy of complete sterilization. Neumann (1984),
using Bundesbank data that distinguished between active and passive
intervention and estimating a reaction function for the 1974-1981
period found that the sterilization coefficient was negative and large
but less than unity. Vaubel (1980) advanced a more extreme
"punishment" hypothesis by claiming that the Bundesbank tried to impose
its monetary policy dominance over the other European central banks by
"punishing" them whenever it was forced to intervene in support of the
European currencies participating to the pre-EMS "snake"; according to
this hypothesis the punishment consisted in overcompensating the
effects on the German monetary base of its foreign exchange
interventions (a sterilization coefficient greater than one in absolute
value). The results of Obstfeld (1983) and Neumann (1984) do not
confirm this "punishment" hypothesis; however, they provide ample
evidence that sterilization of reserve flows was systematically pursued
by the Bundesbank throughout the 1970s.
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coefficients; in reality, they might just represent high offset
coefficient. In other terms, while equation (a) interprets the relation
between domestic credit and net foreign assets as a causal relation
that goes from foreign assets to domestic credit, the actual relation
could go from domestic credit to foreign assets.
A similar and dual endogeneity problem arises in the estimation of
capital flow equations where the objective is to obtain estimates of
the offset coefficient.
offset parameter

6

The standard approach to the estimation of the

starts from the asset markets equilibrium conditions

and the central bank balance sheet and derives a reduced form equation
that relates the capital account of the balance of payments (CAP) to
the change in domestic credit (DOC), the current account balance

* the change in
(CURR), the change in foreign interest rates (DR),
nominal income (DY) and a vector of other exogenous variables (EXOG)

7

In equation (b), the parameter ~l is an estimate of the offset
coefficient. The main problem with OLS estimates of equation (b) is
that domestic credit is an endogenous variable when the central bank

6. This approach is followed by Argy and Kouri (1974), Kouri and Porter
(1974), Kouri (1975), Neumann (1978), Herring and Marston (1977a,b),
Obstfeld (1978, 1982a, 1982b).
7. An analytical derivation of equation (b) in described in section 3.

7

follows a sterilization policy; OLS estimates of the parameters of
equation (2) will then be inconsistent

8

Given the inconsistency of the OLS estimates of the offset and
sterilization parameter because of the endogeneity of the net foreign
asset and domestic credit variables in these equations, what will be
the direction of the bias of the OLS estimators of the sterilization
and offset coefficients? It can be shown that OLS estimators will bias
both coefficients towards minus one. Consider again equation (a) and
(b) and the definition of the change in net foreign assets as the sum
of the current account and capital account (equation (c)):

(a)

(c)

Substituting (c) in (a), (a) and (b) can be rewritten in compact form
as:

(a')

(b')

8. While most of the work on the offset coefficient is based on OLS
estimates, some authors (Argy and Kouri (1974) and Obstfeld (1982a, b))
use instrumental variables and estimate equation (2) by two-stage least
squares.
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where x

1

and x

2

are the vectors of the exogenous regressors in

equations (a) and (b).
Given the endogeneity of DNFA in equation (a) and of DDC in
equation (b), these explanatory variables are correlated with the error
terms in their respective equations and 0LS estimates of both a 1 and {3 1
are inconsistent. It can be easily shown that the bias on a 1 and p1 ,
the estimated values of a 1 and {3 1 , is given by the expressions (d) and
( e):

2
{Jl(l-al {31) a u
2
fJ'V(X2)fJ + fJi a u

2
+ a€

2
al(l-{31 al) a €
2 2
a'V(X )a + a a €
1
1

2
+ au

(d)

(e)

V(X ) and V(X ) are the asymptotic variance-covari ance matrices
2
1
x1 and x2 . Stability of the model requires that a 1 {3 1 < 1 that will
always be satisfied as long as the sterilization coefficient ({3 1 ) and
9
offset coefficient (a 1 ) are not smaller than minus one . Given that a 1
and {3 are negative, the formulas (d) and (e) imply that the 0LS bias
1

where

9. Assuming realistically that the offset effect is, at the maximum,
equal to minus one (-1 < a 1 < 0) and that sterilization is, at the
maximum, complete (-1 < f3 < 0), this stability condition is always
satisfied. The offset coetficient is bounded downward by minus one only
if the exchange rate is pegged with certainty. However, if exchange
rate realignments are possible, a "peso problem" will result and the
estimated offset coefficient might be greater than unity in absolute
value. In fact, close to realignments, expected changes in the exchange
rate may lead to offset of domestic credit on reserves that are more
than one-to-one.

9

in the estimation of a

1

and p is negative, i.e. OLS estimates of both
1

parameters will be biased towards minus one. This means that OLS
estimates of the sterilization coefficient will tend to show high
degrees of sterilization in all the countries when the true value of
these sterilization policies is smaller; similarly, the estimates of
the offset coefficient will be biased towards high measures of offset.
In order to deal with the simultaneity bias deriving from the
endogeneity of the reserve and domestic credit variables, the approach
followed by many authors
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has been to use instrumental variables to

estimate (a) and (b) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). This route to
the solution of the simultaneity bias problem is however ridden with a
number of problems.
First of all, consistent 2SLS estimates of the sterilization
coefficient suggest that most of the countries in a fixed rate regime
like the Bretton Woods system or the EMS are able to sterilize their
reserves flows (the estimates of the sterilization coefficient are
highly negative). This is however incompatible with the operation of a
fixed rate regime where only one member, the leader country, can
· 11y steri·1·i ze reserve flows 11
systematica

Moreover, the estimates of

the parameters on the macro targets in the reaction function (a)
(inflation and output gap) are generally insignificant and often of the
wrong sign suggesting that the reaction function might be mispecified.
10. Argy and Kouri (1974), Herring and Marston (1977), Obstfeld
(1982a, b), Mastropasqua, Micossi and Rinaldi (1988), Roubini (1988 a).
11. For the instability of reserve flows when more than one country
tries to sterilize see De Grauwe (1977), Aoki (1977), Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1988a, b) and Roubini (1988a, c).
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Secondly, and more importantly, the reaction function (a) is not
derived from any particular maximization problem solved by a monetary
authority but rather presented in a ad-hoc

manner. In particular, any

maximization problem where output and inflation enter in the loss
function of the central bank could not lead to a reduced form reaction
function like (a) where the two targets appear. The first order
conditions of such a problem would imply that these final targets would
disappear from the reduced form and be supplanted by the underlying
shocks and/or exogenous variables to which the central bank is
reacting. In view of this substantial misspecification of the reaction
function, it is not surprising that "consistent" estimates of the
parameters of this reaction function give insignificant estimates of
the two macro targets and are unable to identify the true value of the
sterilization coefficient.
Third, given the misspecification of the sterilization function,
consistent instrumental variable estimator of the offset coefficient in
the capital flow equation (b) are also unable to identify the true
value of the offset parameter.
Given the nature of the problems with the traditional approach to
the estimation of the offset and sterilization function, the next
section presents a model where these functions are derived from the an
explicit maximization problem solved by the monetary authority. In that
approach, it can be shown that speaking of a unique value of the
sterilization parameter becomes meaningless because the optimal
sterilization and foreign exchange intervention policies are no

11

constant but dependent on the disturbance s hitting the economy and the
preferences of the monetary authority.

3. Offset and Sterilizatio n with an Optimizing Central Bank

Ye have seen in the previous section that the main proplems with
the traditional approach to the estimation of sterilizatio n and offset
functions are twofold: first, the standard reaction function used in
the literature on sterilizatio n is assumed in ad hoc manner and is not
derived from any specific maximizatio n problem of the central bank;
second, the reduced form of a correctly specified offset function will
also depend on the optimizatio n problem solved by the central bank.
Methodolog ically, a more correct approach is to consider
explicitly the problem faced by a monetary authority and derive an
optimal reaction function where the central bank chooses simultaneou sly
its optimal interventio n and sterilizatio n policies by reacting to the
various disturbance s that hit the economy.
In this section we will try to address this issue by considering a
simple financial model of a small open economy with fixed exchange
rates and derive the reaction function for its monetary authority. In
order to consider the implication s of imperfect capital mobility and
asset substitutab ility we will present a model where the degree of
asset substitutab ility between domestic and foreign asset is not
complete

12

12. A interesting recent paper by Giavazzi (1987) considers the policy
trade-offs of a central bank trying to stabilize the money supply
following current account and asset preference shocks. However, this

12
Consider the following model of the financial bloc of a small open
economy under fixed rates:

H=R+D

(1)

(2)

B

(3)

H = ho r + hl r * + h Y + h W
2
3

(4)

h <0, h =0, h >0, h >0
0
2
3
1

Bd = b

Fd = f

0

0

r - b

r + f

1

r* + b

W

(5)

b >0, b >0, b <0, b >0
0
2
3
1

1

r * + f2 Y + f3 W

(6)

f <0, f >0, f <0, f3 >0
0
1
2

2

Y+ b

3

where:

(ho + bO + fo) - 0
(hl - b 1 + fl)

~

0

(h2 + b2 + f2)

~

0

(h

2

+ b ) > 0
2

(h3 + b3 + f3) - 1

and:

H = High powered money

contribution does not present an explicit optimization model for the
behavior of the central bank.
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R - Foreign exchange rate reserves (foreign bonds held by the
central bank)
D

Domestic credit (domestic bonds held by the central bank)

W

Total financial wealth of domestic residents

Bd

Domestic bonds held by domestic residents

B

Exogenous stock of domestic bonds

Fd

Foreign bonds held by domestic residents

r

Interest rate on domestic bonds

r*

Interest rate on foreign bonds

Y

Domestic real income

We will concentrate on the financial side of the model and consider a
short term analysis; then we can take income (Y) as given; W, domestic
wealth is also assumed to be exogenous and its change is equal to the
current account of the balance of payments. The country is small and
therefore the foreign interest rate will also be exogenous. However,
the specification of the asset demand functions does not impose an
assumption of perfect asset substitutability so that the interest
parity condition between domestic and foreign asset does not
necessarily hold

13

Given the financial flavor of the model we do not assume that the
objective of the central bank is to stabilize output and inflation as
the standard sterilization literature does. We will rather assume that,
in the short run that we are considering, the objective of the central
13. As a special case of the model, we can get perfect asset
substitutability for b = b =~.We will discuss this special case
1
0
below.
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bank is to stabilize foreign exchange reserves and domestic interest
rates. The inclusion of foreign exchange reserves can be explained by
the argument that central banks under fixed exchange rates care about
14 15
. The interest rate target
their level of net foreign reserves
depends on the short term nature of the model: for given expected
values of the real variables of the system and the inflation rate, ·the
central bank might want to reduce the short term volatility of interest
rates

16

1
L
2

. We can then write the loss function of the central bank as:
1

( r ) 2

+

(7)

Q

2

where a is the weight given to the foreign reserves objective relative
to the interest rate smoothing goal in the loss function. The central

14. Theoretical ly, if the central bank could borrow foreign reserves in
unlimited amounts, it might not care about its level of reserves.
However, there is ample evidence that central banks care about their
level of reserves. Roubini (1987 a) discussed at length why that is the
case. Among the various reasons: first, if central banks care about
their net foreign reserves borrowing gross reserves would not affect
their amount net of borrowing. Second, the opportunity cost of
borrowing reserves is likely to be positive and its marginal cost
increasing. Third, liquidity constraints in the internation al capital
markets and/or "conditiona lity" in borrowing (from IMF and/or the EMS
borrowing facility) limit the ability to borrow and/or increase its
marginal cost.
15. The assumption of a foreign reserve objective is the standard one
in model of strategic policy interaction s under fixed exchange rate
regimes; in this regard, see the seminal contributio ns of Hamada
collected in Hamada (1985).
16. In a recent paper Barro (1988) makes the same assumption of an
"interest rate smoothing" objective of the central bank.
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bank uses domestic credit (D) as its policy instrument to control its
.
.
17
two ob Jectives

Using equations (1)-(6) we can write the reduced form solution for
the interest rate (r) and foreign reserve (R) variables as:

r * +.

r =

1

( B - D - b 2 Y - ·b 3 W )

(8)

D

(9)

R

. ( 1 +

)

As can be seen from equation (9)

the offset of a domestic credit

18
.
.
. negative
.
b ut 1 ess tan
h
·
expansion
on f oreign
reserves is
unity
the special case of perfect asset substitutability where (b

0

- b

in
1

-

00

)

we get:

17. One could equivalently assume that foreign reserves are the policy
instrument in which case domestic credit (D) becomes endogenous. The
results of the model are identical under the two alternative
assumptions.

18. Equation (9) is essentially identical to the semi-reduced form
capital flow equation (b) estimated in the studies of the offset
coefficient. The endogeneity of the domestic credit variable (D) in
this equation is the source of the problem with the traditional
estimates of this function.
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r = r

*

(8')

d R

(10)

= - 1
d D

i.e. domestic rates are always equal to foreign ones and the offset
coefficient is equal to minus one.
Given the solution for the interest rate and the foreign reserves
in equations (8) and (9), the problem of the central bank is to
minimize the loss function (7) with respect to the policy instrument
Taking the first order conditions

(D) subject to the system (8)-(9).

and grinding through the algebra, one obtains the following reaction
function for the domestic credit variable:

b 2
0

D

l

*

+

[1/bo

1

h

b2

_Ob)] y +

+[-

[

b

b 2

b 2

0

0

- -

ho
b

0

b )] W

3

(11)

0

2
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Substituting

the reaction function (11) in the equations (8)-(9) for r

and R, we obtain the final reduced form for the interest rate and the
foreign reserves:

r*

r =

y

-1
B

] B

+

r*

R=

]W+

+ [

+ [

(12)

] w+

+

y

(13)

One can observe that in the reduced form equations for the
domestic credit reaction function (11) and the offset function for
reserves (13), these two variables depend only on the exogenous
variables and disturbances hitting the system. In particular, the two
endogenous variables do not depend on each other in these reduced

18
forms; in these sense these solution differ from the standard semi
reduced sterilization and capital-flow functions found in the
literature where domestic credit and foreign reserves depended on each
other.
We will now consider the movements of interest rates, domestic
credit and foreign reserves following a number of exogenous
disturbances to discuss the circumstances under which it is likely to
observe the large and negative empirical correlations between domestic
credit and foreign reserves found in the estimation of offset and
sterilization equations

19

A. A foreign interest rate shock

Let us start by considering a foreign disturbance in the form of
an increase in the foreign interest rate (r * ). From equation (11), the
effect of the change in r * on domestic credit, foreign reserves and the
interest rate is:

b 2

d D
d r

0

*

- b

dR

1

1 +

19.

[1/bo

See Roubini (1988 a).

< 0

0

(15)

(14)

d r
:S

d r*

(16)

1

The optimal response of the monetary authority depends on the degree of
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets; consider first
the case of perfect asset substitutability where b

0

= b

1

= oo; in this

case, equations (11)-(13) imply:

d D

d r

d R

d r*

d r*

0

d r*

1

(17)

If assets are perfectly substitutable, the domestic interest rate
must equal the foreign one; then, any attempt to stabilize the domestic
interest rate in face of the foreign shock would be futile. The optimal
response of the central bank in then to forget the interest rate target
and rather attempt to stabilize the level of foreign reserves. The
foreign rate shock, in the absence of a reaction by the central bank,
would lead to a loss of reserves (see equation (13)); however, by
reducing domestic credit by the amount by which money demand has fallen
following the shock in r * (i.e. by h ) the central bank in able to
0
stabilize completely the level of foreign reserves. In this case, then,
we would observe empirically a fall in domestic credit with no change
in foreign reserves, i.e.:

d R

0

d D

20

We can consider next the more general case where assets are less
than perfectly substitutable; in this case the optimal response of
domestic credit depends on the relative weight of the interest rate and
foreign reserve targets in the loss function (7). The trade-off faced
by the monetary authority is clear: given the rise in the foreign rate,
it can stabilize interest rates by expanding domestic credit (see
equation (8)) in which case it would lose foreign reserves (see
equation (9)) or it can stabilize foreign reserves by contracting
domestic credit in which case it has to allow the domestic interest to
rise towards the higher foreign one. If the central bank cares about
both objectives ( 0 <a< oo), then it will contract domestic credit if
it cares more about reserves while it will expand credit if the
smoothing of interest rates is more important. More formally, domestic
credit will be expanded or contracted on the basis of the following
critical condition:

d D
d r*

>

<
0

<

if

1
(18)

Q

(1/2)

>
(-bo<bo+ho)>

What will occur to the level of foreign reserves? Equation

(15) shows

that, independently of what happens to domestic credit, foreign
reserves will unequivocally fall (as long as b 0 < oo). The result is
again intuitive: in the absence of a reaction of domestic credit, the
rise in r * would lead to a fall in reserves; then, if domestic credit

21
in (14) in increased in order to stabilize the interest rate (low a
case from (18)), the foreign reserves will fall even more. However,
even if domestic credit is contracted (the case of a high value of a in

(18)), the optimal reaction of Dis not enough to prevent some fall in
foreign reserves; then, in either case, foreign reserves must fall

. r*.
following the rise 1n
The empirical implication of this result is that we will observe a
negative correlation of domestic credit and foreign reserves if the
central bank does not care a lot about reserves and tries to stabilize
interest rates in the short run (a low value of a)

while we will

observe comovements in the same direction of Rand D if the main
objective of the monetary authority is to stabilize the level of
foreign reserves (a high value of a).
This role of the preferences of the monetary authority can be
further discussed and formally derived by considering how the optimal
reaction to a foreign shock depends on a, the relative weight of the
two objectives in the reaction function. Consider the reaction to a
foreign interest rate shock in the two limiting cases where a= 0 (the
central bank cares only about interest rate smoothing) and a=
central bank cares only about foreign reserves):

d D

d

r*

d R

d r

*

d D

-1

or
d R

(19)

w

(the
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a = a)

d D
d r*

dR

<

0

d r*

0

(20)

If the monetary authority does not care about reserves (a - 0), we will
observe comovemnts of reserves and domestic credit that are negative
and perfectly correlated. As a increases, this correlation becomes
smaller (in absolute value) and turns positive for a rising above the
critical value in condition (18).
One implication of these results for the EMS is that the large and
negative correlations of domestic credit and foreign reserves found in
sterilization studies of the EMS

20

even for the case of the smaller

"follower" countries could be consistent with a view of these EMS
central banks as being more concerned about the short term
stabilization of interest rates relative to the objective of
maintaining their level of foreign reserves. In this sense, even for a
follower country it would be optimal to sterilize partially the foreign
reserve losses following an increase in the level of foreign interest
rates. This sterilization is feasible as long as domestic and foreign
assets are less than perfectly substitutable (b 0 - b 1 < a)) so that the
offset coefficient is less than unity; but its foreign reserve loss
cost becomes greater as the degree of substitutability becomes larger.
To conclude the discussion of the effects of a foreign interest

20.

See Roubini (1988 a).
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rate shock we can consider the case of zero asset substitutability (or
no capital mobility). In this case b

1

is equal to zero and we then get:

r

d D

dR

d

d r*

d r*

d r

*

0

(21)

If assets are not substitutable, foreign interest rate shocks do not
affect the domestic variables in which case the optimal policy is to do
nothing; in this case neither domestic credit nor foreign reserves will
be affected by the shock.

B. A current account shock

We will consider next the effect of an exogenous current account
(CA) shock represented here by a change in financial wealth:

CA

d W

In this case the solution for the domestic credit and the foreign
reserves will be:

d D

>
0

dW

<

(22)
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d R

-b

3

(1

dW

>

+

-b

ho

-)

3 b

(23)

0

0

In the absence of a reaction by the monetary authority, equations
(8) and (9) show that the current account shock would lead to an
increase in foreign reserves and a fall in the domestic interest rate.
Then, the central bank can try to stabilize the domestic interest rate
by reducing domestic credit (see equation (8)) but this would further
increase the level of foreign reserves above its targeted level;
conversely, the central ·bank might want to stabilize the level of
reserves (by expanding domestic credit as in equation (9)) but this
policy choice would lead to a further decline of interest rates. The
optimal choice of the central bank will again depend on the relative
weight of the two objectives; if it cares more about interest rates (a
low a) it will contract credit; otherwise ( a high a) it will expand
credit to stabilize reserves; more formally, it is simple to show that:

d D

>

>
0

dW

<

for

a

(1/2)
}

<

(24)

r·
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Unlike the effect on domestic credit, the effects of the current
account shock on foreign reserves is unambiguous as can be seen from
equation (23). In the absence of a domestic credit reaction by the
central bank, the foreign reserves would increase following the current
account shock; then, if the central bank contract domestic credit to
stabilize interest rates (the case of a low value od a) the foreign
reserve will increase even further; however, even if domestic credit is
contracted (case of a high a), the foreign reserves would still rise
because the direct positive effects of the current account shock on
reserves dominates the secondary effect coming from the domestic credit
reaction of the monetary authority.
It then follows that if the monetary authority cares more about
smoothing interest rates (low a) we will observe empirically large and
negative correlations of domestic credit and foreign reserves following
current account shocks; while we will observe positive comovements of
the two variables if the central bank leans towards stabilizing foreign
reserves
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We will turn now to some special cases by considering the current
account shock under the assumption of perfect asset substitutabilit y
(b

0

- b1 -

d D

00 ) ;

in this case we obtain:

d r

dR

= 0

0

dW

d W

(25)

dW

21. Note the symmetry of this result with the one obtained in the case
of a foreign interest rate shock.
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Given the perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, the
domestic interest rate does not change. In the absence of a policy
reaction, foreign reserves would increase following the current account
shock; then, the central bank can completely insulate the effect of the
shock on the level of foreign reserves by expanding the domestic
credit; then, the increased money demand following the wealth shock is
satisfied through the increase in domestic without any effect on

22
.
f ore1.gn reserves

In this case we would then observe an increase in

domestic credit with no change in foreign reserves .
We can finally consider the effects of the preferences of the
central bank on the outcome of a current account shock. As discussed
above the more (less) the central bank cares about interest rate
smoothing (foreign reserve stabilization) the greater the contraction
in domestic credit will be following a current account shock and the
greater the expansion of foreign reserves. In the limit when a =0, we
obtain:

Q

= 0

d D

d R

dW

dW

(26)

22. Alternatively, in the framework of Giavazzi (1987) where the
central cares only about domestic interest rates, the case of perfect
capital mobility will automatically insure that domestic interest rate
is stabilized and that "the central bank is relieved from the burden of
monitoring the domestic money market".
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and:
d D

dR
In this case the observed empirical correlation between domestic credit
and foreign reserves will be negative and tending to minus one if the
money demand elasticity relative to wealth is small ( h

3

- 0). Again,

as in the case of foreign interest rate shocks, the observation of
large negative correlation of domestic credit and foreign reserves
observed in the EMS countries could be interpreted as the optimal
response of a central bank caring about interest rate stabilization in
the presence of exogenous current account shocks. Similarly, the model
implies that negative current account shock will lead to losses in
foreign reserves and increases in domestic credit as the central bank
tries to prevent the increase in domestic interest rates caused by the
current account disturbance; in this case, the sterilization of these
foreign reserve losses is feasible as long as domestic and foreign
asset are not perfectly substitutable. It must also be observed that
this interest rate smoothing objective becomes increasingly costly, in
terms of foreign reserves losses, as the degree of substitution between
domestic and foreign assets increases and the offset coefficient
becomes greater.

C. An increase in domestic bonds
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We consider next the case of a domestic bond disturbance, i.e. an
increase in the supply of domestic bonds deriving, for example, from
the bond financing of a fiscal shock.
Equation (8)-(9) show that the impact effect of the shock, in the
absence of a central bank optimal reaction, leads to an increase of
interest rates and a fall in foreign exchange reserves. Interest rate
have to rise to absorb the increased supply of domestic bonds while
foreign reserves fall since the domestic residents diversify out of
domestic asset into foreign asset. In the case of this bond shock the
trade-off faced by the central bank is clear: it can stabilize the
interest rate through a domestic credit expansion at the cost of an
even greater loss of reserves or it can stabilize the level of reserves
by contracting domestic credit and pushing further up the level of the
domestic interest rates. Again the choice of the central bank will
depend on its relative preference for the interest rate and foreign
reserve objectives. More formally the effect of the shock on domestic
credit and reserves is:

>

d D

0

<

d B

d R

(27)

- 1

<

0

(28)

d B

Equation (27) implies that domestic credit will fall or rise depending
on the following condition:
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d D

for

0
dB

1

<

>

(29)

a

>

<

(1/2)

[<ho+bo)ho1
i.e. domestic credit will be expanded if the central bank cares more
about interest rate smoothing while it will be contract if it prefers
to preserve the level of reserves. Condition (28) shows, however, that
independently of whether domestic credit is expanded or contracted,
foreign reserves will fall: if domestic credit is expanded the impact
loss of reserves is reinforced by the fall of reserves engineered by
the domestic credit expansion; if domestic credit is contracted the
impact loss of reserves dominates the secondary positive effect on
reserves coming from the monetary contraction.
As in the case of a foreign interest rate and current account
shocks, this result implies that a bond financed fiscal shock will lead
to the observation of negatively correlated comovements of foreign
reserves and domestic credit if the central bank is concerned about
stabilizing interest rates and positive comovements if the central bank
leans towards stabilizing foreign reserves. In the extreme case of
perfect capital mobility, interest rates are pegged to the foreign ones
and no change occurs in either foreign reserves or domestic credit,
i.e.:

d r

d D

d R

d B

dB

d B

0
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D. A domestic output shock

As a last case we will consider a domestic output shock (a change
in Y). The impact effect of the shock is to increase domestic

interest

rates (through its positive effect on money demand) (see equation (8))
and increase foreign exchange reserves (equation (9)) as the increased
money demand and interest rate lead to a capital inflow. In order to
avoid the deviations of interest rates and foreign reserves from their
targeted levels, the central bank will have to unambiguous ly increase
domestic credit because such a monetary expansion will reduce both
interest rates and foreign reserves. Formally the optimal response of
domestic credit and reserves will be:

d D
>

dY

0

(30)

"'

d R

d y

>

0

(31)

1 +

Equations (30)-(31) show that the optimal reaction of domestic credit
and foreign reserves is unambiguous : they both increase. Domestic
credit must increase in order to reduce interest rate and reserves to
their pre-shock levels while reserves increase on net because the
primary positive effect of the shock on reserves dominates the
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secondary negative effect coming from the increase in domestic credit.
It then follows that in the case of an output shock domestic credit and
foreign reserves will comove in the same direction.

4.Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to explain the large negatively
correlated comovements of domestic credit and foreign exchange reserves
found in the analysis of sterilization policies under fixed exchange
rates and in the EMS experience. It was shown that such correlations
can be explained in a model where the central bank tries to smooth the
short run fluctuations of domestic interest rates and foreign exchange
reserves under fixed exchange rates. In particular, under a wide range
of domestic and foreign disturbances the optimal response of the
central bank will lead to negatively correlated comovements of domestic
credit and foreign reserves if the central bank cares more about the
interest rate smoothing objective relative to the foreign exchange
reserve stabilization goal. These disturbances include foreign interest
rate shocks, current account shocks and fiscally induced increase in
domestic bonds. Conversely, positively correlated comovements of
domestic credit and foreign reserves will be observed if the foreign
exchange reserve objective is dominant. The results are obtained under
the assumption the domestic and foreign assets are not perfectly
substitutable. In this case the central bank is able to maintain some
degree of control on its interest rates through the domestic credit
instrument (the offset coefficient is smaller than minus one in
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absolute value). In the limiting case of perfect capital mobility, the
domestic central bank has no control on its domestic interest rate and
its domestic credit policy will be aimed at maintaining the targeted
level of foreign reserves.
The implications of these results are that, as long as capital is
not perfectly mobile and asset not perfectly substitutable, even a
small "follower" country in a fixed exchange rate system like the EMS
is going to be able and will optimally "sterilize" the effects on its
money supply of changes in foreign reserves generated by a number of
disturbances. This sterilizing response will occur if the objective of
stabilizing domestic interest rate in the short run dominates the
objective of maintaining a certain level of foreign reserves. The
analysis also implies that the optimal degree of "sterilization" is not
constant but rather depends on the type of shock that disturbs the
economy. In this sense the sterilization and offset functions found in
the literature do not fully consider the nature of the stabilization
problem faced by a monetary authority in a fixed exchange regime. An
empirical test of the model presented in this paper is certainly the
next step to be considered.
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